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Navy, Russian (1991-) 
     After arguably achieving rough parity with the U.S. Navy during the Cold War,  
the Russian Federation Navy has experienced significant decline over the 
subsequent two decades.  Some of this decline has been due to serious financial 
constraints preventing fleet modernization with other contributing factors being 
the superior political clout of the Army, and problems with the navy’s supporting 
industrial infrastructure which have kept it from maintaining anything resembling 
Soviet era blue water strength and capabilities. 
     A vivid demonstration of the Navy’s declining power includes the August 12, 
2000 sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk in the Arctic Ocean producing 118 
deaths.  This tragedy produced a rare public outcry against the government’s and 
navy’s incompetence.    Another notable demonstration of Russian Navy inability 
to modernize and demonstrate professional competence has been the failure to 
successfully test and deploy the Bulava submarine -launched ballistic missile.  This 
program began development in the late 1990s and has experienced cost overruns 
and repeated test-launch failures although some successful launches prompted 
former President Dmitry Medvedev to say it was ready for service in December 
2011.  The Navy’s political clout was further diminished by its 2012 relocation to 
St. Petersburg from Moscow which removes it from ready access to the centers of 
Russian Federation political power--although President Vladimir Putin’s 
hometown is St. Petersburg. 
     Navy ships are constructed by the United Shipbuilding Corporation which is a 
collaboration between the Russian Government and privately managed 
companies; its technological skill and capacity are far behind global competitors 
and pacesetters.  However, the preponderance of Russian Navy ships still date 
from the Soviet era and slow production timetables are a serious problem with 
the Lada class submarine St. Petersburg taking nearly 10 years to reach the 
testing stage.  The Russian Navy has ended its traditional autarkic supply policy by 
importing unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel and Mistral-class ships from 
France. 
     Russian Navy strategy and doctrine place increasing emphasis on accessing and 
using the Arctic Ocean.  This was visibly demonstrated on August 2, 2007 when 
two Russian mini-submarines planted a flag on the North Pole seabed, thus 
staking claim to immense Arctic oil and natural gas reserves and Moscow’s desire 
to increase its global maritime influence.  Climate change in the Arctic is making it 
possible for ships to use the Northern Sea Route with greater frequency, and 
Russia seeks to take advantage of that to enhance its economic and military 
influence along with transportation links between Europe, Asia, and North 
America.  This could increase the possibility of conflict with the United States, 
China, and other Arctic countries.  Russia is also concerned with having the ability 
to conduct naval operations in the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas and in the 
Pacific Ocean, although the navy’s amphibious assault ships were unable to 
support Russian ground forces fighting Georgian troops during the August 2008 
war between these countries. 
     The Russian Federation Navy still aspires to Soviet-era power and prestige, and 
seeks to include a mixture of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in its arsenal 
though it lacks the industrial base capacity to achieve its objectives.  The Kola 
Peninsula remains the headquarters for Russia’s nuclear deterrent; the navy 
retains 172 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 612 nuclear warheads.  
Climate change in the Arctic is making it possible for ships to use the Northern Sea 
Route with greater frequency and Russia seeks to take advantage of that to 
enhance its economic and military influence along with transportation links 
between Europe, Asia, and North America.  This could increase the possibility of 
conflict with the U.S., China, and other Arctic countries.   
      An even more serious problem is the delusional belief under President 
Vladimir Putin’s leadership that the U.S. and NATO have military designs on Russia 
requiring the maintenance of a large Cold War size fleet.   
      Russia is likely to use its naval forces to influence Arctic Ocean activities to its 
benefit, and to apply maritime and other pressure on neighboring countries such 
as Ukraine,  which used to be part of the former Soviet Union and are not NATO 
members.  The possibility of economically constrained NATO countries and the 
United States not being willing or able to intervene on behalf of maritime 
countries adjacent to Russia may increase the possibility of even a weakened 
Russia being able to exert greater influence or even outright domination of these 
countries.  This was very much the case when Crimean separatists, likely backed 
by Russia, forced Ukraine to cede the peninsula back to Russia in the spring of 
2014. 
                                                                                                             Bert Chapman 
See also: Georgian War (2008); Kursk (Submarine); Navy, Soviet (1917-1991); 
Putin, Vladimir V. (1952-). 
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